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12 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for
Intelligence

SUBJECT : Producing the Military Estimates:
Another View

25X1A9A 1. Attached is a bootleg copy of a draft memorandum by [] reviewing ONE's experience with the military estimates under the new rules and outlining possible ways of organizing the job the next time round.

2. You and Jack should read it. It says a number of things we don't think are very accurate. It also says some things that make a fair degree of sense. Its chief value is in what it reveals about ONE's perception of what has been happening and what its role is. This of itself is one of the key factors in the situation.

25X1A9A 3. This is no time for any detailed comment. I do call attention, however, to the following themes, which probably represent the collective wisdom of ONE rather than only [] personal views:

--Writing estimates is a task for estimators rather than researchers. The ONE staff could have done better than the DDI/DDS&T task forces.

--11-8 was a good job largely because of the ability and drive of the BNE chairman and because the large amounts of manpower invested in it finally compensated for the inexperience and ineptitude of the task force.

--A major defect of the task force system was that the Board chairman lacked full authority over the task force members. This must be corrected in the future.

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- The whole task force approach conflicts with ONE's special relationship with and responsibility to the DCI in his capacity as chairman of USIB. It alone is uniquely positioned to pull together contributions of the entire community.
- The concept of an NIE with more extensive treatment of key problems should be kept but the document should be streamlined. Specifically, the need for projections "in strings of figures" as in 11-8 and 11-3 should be "rethought."



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BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research

Attachment:
As Stated

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